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Abstract
Utility-based green electricity programs provide market opportunities for consumers to reduce
the carbon footprint of their electricity use. These programs deploy three types of public-goods
contribution mechanisms: voluntary contribution, green tariff, and all-or-nothing green tariff
(Kotchen and Moore 2007). We extend the theoretical understanding of the all-or-nothing green
tariff mechanism by showing that an assumption of warm-glow preferences is needed to explain
widespread participation in programs deploying this mechanism. We conduct the first
experimental test to compare the revenue generating capacity of a pure public good (based on the
voluntary contribution mechanism) and an impure public good (based on the green tariff
mechanism). In experimental play, the voluntary contribution mechanism raises 50 percent more
revenue than the green tariff mechanism. With the all-or-nothing green tariff, experimental play
and regression estimates show that a warm-glow preference positively affects participation, as
predicted by the theory.
Keywords: impure public good, laboratory experiment, voluntary environmental program, warmglow altruism
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1. Introduction
A suite of markets for green electricity products provides opportunity for U.S. households
and businesses to reduce their carbon footprint from electricity consumption. These markets
include utility-based green electricity programs, carbon offsets, and various green electricity
products that exist in states with deregulated electricity markets.1 In 2012, electricity-equivalent
sales in these markets totaled 48.6 million megawatt-hours, or 1.3 percent of total U.S. electricity
sales (Heeter and Nicholas 2013). On average, this translated into a reduction of roughly 37.8
million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions from avoided generation of conventional
electricity, or the equivalent of removing about 7.4 million cars from the roads for the year.
Utility-based green electricity programs are a substantial segment of the overall market. Over
700 electric utilities and related companies offered these programs in 2012, with almost 550,000
residential customers enrolled (Heeter and Nicholas 2013). Program sales increased by 76
percent, from 3.4 million to 6.0 million megawatt-hours, between 2006 and 2012. As a voluntary
approach, green electricity programs constitute one tool in a mix of voluntary and regulatory
approaches to environmental management.
In this research, we study the theoretical and empirical properties of the three primary
enrollment mechanisms used in green electricity programs: the voluntary contribution
mechanism (VCM), green tariff mechanism (GTM), and all-or-nothing green tariff mechanism
(A/NGTM). Electric utilities seem compelled to offer these programs to satisfy demand by their
environmentally minded consumers. Overall, the average participation rate is 2.8 percent of
eligible customers. Some utilities, however, achieve much greater success: participation rates at
the top 10 programs vary from a low of 5.0 percent to a high of 18.2 percent (Heeter and
1

These markets complement state-based regulatory programs for reducing CO2 emissions from electricity
generation. As of 2017, the federal government does not regulate CO2 emissions from power plants, although such
regulations are being developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
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Nicholas 2013). We address several interrelated theoretical and empirical questions within this
general context of a large number of modestly performing programs. How do the different
mechanisms compare in their capacity to enroll subscribers and to generate subscription revenues
in support of green electricity provision? How do group contributions crowd out individual
contributions? What is the role of warm-glow altruism in explaining program subscription? For
these questions, we develop a theoretical prediction and then test or examine the prediction using
data collected in experimental public-good games patterned after the enrollment mechanisms.
We first develop the theory of public-good provision in the context of the VCM, GTM,
and A/NGTM mechanisms.2 The VCM establishes a fixed program payment, typically monthly,
that is independent of a household’s electricity use. This could be accomplished, for example, by
a household purchasing a fixed block of 100 kilowatt-hours per month at a green tariff, or
premium, of two cents per kilowatt-hour. The GTM applies a price premium per unit of
electricity use over some share of use. Here, for example, a household could pay a two cents per
kilowatt-hour tariff on 50 percent of its monthly use; the payment thus would vary with use. The
A/NGTM applies the tariff to 100 percent of electricity use for a participating household. Again,
the payment would vary with monthly electricity use. Kotchen and Moore (2007) developed
results on the relative capacity of the three mechanisms to generate aggregate provision revenues
as a function of the magnitude of the green tariff.
We derive three new findings that add insight into these mechanisms. 3 First, we correct
an important result on aggregate provision with the A/NGTM. Kotchen and Moore (2007)

2

The VCM conforms to the theoretical framework of a privately provided public good (Bergstrom, Blume, and
Varian 1986). The GTM and A/NGTM apply the theory of a privately provided impure public good (Cornes and
Sandler 1984, 1994). Kotchen (2006, 2009) extends these theoretical frameworks to analyze markets for green
products and carbon offsets, for which green electricity programs are commonly used as a motivating example.
3
Unlike Kotchen and Moore (2007) who developed a three-good framework, we construct a two-good model. Twogood models are particularly useful for testing empirical validity of the predictions through laboratory experiments.
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demonstrated that, under pure altruism, there exists a middle range of tariffs under which the
A/NGTM will induce more aggregate provision than either a VCM or a GTM. We show that the
extent of the range is smaller than previously understood, and that pure altruism is unlikely to
generate any revenue for the A/NGTM. Second, we develop a new result on aggregate provision
in a large economy. The standard result for both the VCM and GTM is that individual
contributions decrease and total contributions increase as the number of participants grows. 4 The
A/NGTM differs sharply, according to our second finding, with both individual and aggregate
contributions decreasing to zero as the number of participants grows large. This result leads to a
question: why do consumers participate in such a program? Our third finding proposes an answer
to this: consumers with warm-glow preferences will participate at a higher rate in an A/NGTM
program under conditions described in the paper.
In an empirical component, we implement laboratory experiments in which participants
play symmetric public-good games with one good characterized as an environmental public
good.5 The experiments are used to compare the revenue generating capacity of the VCM and
GTM, with parameters for the games chosen to test the theoretical prediction of identical revenue
generation under the two mechanisms. We find that VCM raises 50 percent more revenue than
the GTM. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental comparison of the revenue generating
capacity between a pure and an impure public good mechanism. 6 In addition, the theory predicts
that an increase in others’ aggregate contributions under the VCM or the GTM crowd out

4

In the paper, we interchangeably use the words contributions, provision, and revenues. This reflects the context of
public-goods theory along with the practical setting of raising revenue to finance green electricity capacity.
5

Rose et al (2002) used laboratory experiments to study a public-good provision point mechanism to analyze
subjects’ participation in and willingness to contribute to a green electricity program.
6
Studying the VCM in a laboratory experiment follows a tradition of experiments on contributions to a pure public
good (e.g., Andreoni 1995a, 1995b). Similar to our work on the GTM and A/NGTM, recent research uses laboratory
experiments to study contributions to an impure public good (Munro and Valente 2009; Engelmann et al. 2011).
However, using laboratory experiments to compare the pure and impure public good mechanisms is novel.
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individual contributions at a 1:1 rate. The regression estimates suggest that crowding-out, while
statistically significant, occurs at a smaller rate than 1:1.
The experiments also collect data on participants’ environmental taste and altruistic taste,
along with data on a warm-glow motive. Use of these data establishes a basis of comparison to
earlier research. Oberholzer-Gee (2001) found evidence of an altruism effect and a warm-glow
effect among participants in a green electricity program in Switzerland. Kotchen and Moore
(2007) found that an environmental taste and an altruism taste affected whether to participate in
an A/NGTM program in Michigan, and that the same two tastes affected the level of contribution
to a (different) VCM program in Michigan. In our work, a variable representing the
environmental taste of each participant helps to explain individual contributions in the VCM
experiments. In the A/NGTM experiment, the results suggest that warm-glow altruism can
explain participants’ enrollment; this is consistent with the theory for the A/NGTM.
To examine robustness of the experimental results on the VCM and GTM, additional
laboratory sessions are conducted using slight modifications of the original experimental designs.
Results from the added sessions are consonant with the core set of results.

2. Theoretical Models
Consider an economy comprised of 𝑠 individuals, 𝑛 (≤ 𝑠) of whom participate in a green
electricity program. Without loss of generality, the participants are indexed as i = 1, 2, …., n.
Individual i is endowed with exogenously given money income Mi, and his/her utility function is
given by 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑔, 𝐶𝑖 ), where 𝑦𝑖 is a private good (e.g., conventional electricity or ‘allother-goods’), (𝑔𝑖 + 𝑔−𝑖 ) = 𝑔 is the total contributions to electricity generated from renewable
sources (‘green electricity’), 𝑔𝑖 is the ith individual’s contributions, 𝑔−𝑖 is the sum of all others’
contributions, 𝐶𝑖 is a constant that represents the ith individual’s (relative) concern for green
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electricity vis-à-vis the private good. 𝑈𝑖 is assumed to be strictly quasiconcave and twice
continuously differentiable in 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑔𝑖 . Both 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑔𝑖 are assumed to be normal goods. Since
contributions result in production of green electricity which leads to a reduction in pollution, 𝑔 is
viewed as a (environmental) public good. Next, we introduce the three contribution mechanisms.
2.1 The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM)
Under the VCM, an individual voluntarily contributes a certain amount to the public good
and spends the rest on the private good. Assuming each individual is identical in preferences and
money income, the utility maximization problem for individual i can be written as
𝑚𝑎𝑥 [𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑔−𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖 ) 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑀 = 𝑦𝑖 𝑃𝑌 + 𝑔𝑖 ]
𝑦𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖

(1)

where 𝑃𝑌 is the (relative) price of the private good. The setup in equation (1) is related to an
individual choice problem in the presence of a pure public good (Bergstrom et al., 1986). The
symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE, hereinafter) solution (𝑦𝑖∗ , 𝑔𝑖∗ ) for (1) is given by (2) and (3)7
𝑀 = 𝑦𝑖∗ 𝑃𝑌 + 𝑔𝑖∗

(2)

𝜕𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖∗ , 𝑔∗ , 𝐶𝑖 ) 𝜕𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖∗ , 𝑔∗ , 𝐶𝑖 )
⁄
= 𝑃𝑌
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑔𝑖

(3)

2.2 The Green Tariff Mechanism (GTM) with Interior Solution
Under the GTM, an individual’s contributions and her spending on the private good are
directly linked. Individual i chooses a fraction 𝛼𝑖 ∈ [0, 1] of her private good consumption on
which she pays a (per unit) voluntary price premium (𝜋), which is referred to as the “green
tariff”. Individual i contributes 𝜋𝛼𝑖 𝑦𝑖 and the total contributions by all n individuals is
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜋𝛼𝑖 𝑦𝑖 . Individual i solves the following utility maximization problem.
7

Equations (2) and (3) can be derived by using the standard Lagrange Multiplier Method of utility maximization.
The symmetric Nash equilibrium is characterized by (𝑦𝑖∗ , 𝑔𝑖∗ ) = (𝑦𝑗∗ , 𝑔𝑗∗ ) ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Existence of a
Nash equilibrium is ensured by applying Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem on individual best response functions gi*.
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𝑚𝑎𝑥 [𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝜋𝛼𝑖 𝑦𝑖 + 𝑔−𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖 ) 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑀 = 𝑦𝑖 𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋𝛼𝑖 𝑦𝑖 and 0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1]
𝑦𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖

(4)

Equation (4) refers to an impure public good, where the quantity 𝛼𝑖 𝑦𝑖 can be conceived
as a combination of two different characteristics (Cornes and Sandler, 1994): a private
characteristic (consumption of conventional electricity), and a public characteristic (contributions
to green electricity, monetized as 𝜋𝛼𝑖 𝑦𝑖 ). Note that in comparison to the VCM, the present setup
involves an additional constraint (on decision variable 𝛼𝑖 ). If this constraint does not bind
(interior solution), the SNE (𝑦𝑖+ , 𝛼𝑖+ ) is given by (5) and (6)8
𝑀 = 𝑦𝑖+ 𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋𝛼𝑖+ 𝑦𝑖+

(5)

𝜕𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖+ , 𝑛𝜋𝛼𝑖+ 𝑦𝑖+ , 𝐶𝑖 ) 𝜕𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖+ , 𝑛𝜋𝛼𝑖+ 𝑦𝑖+ , 𝐶𝑖 )
⁄
= 𝑃𝑌
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑔𝑖

(6)

A comparison of ((2) & (3)) with ((5) & (6)) implies 𝑦𝑖∗ = 𝑦𝑖+ and 𝑔𝑖∗ = 𝑔𝑖+ = 𝜋𝛼𝑖+ 𝑦𝑖+ . The
equivalence between the VCM and GTM follows from the fact that conditioning upon a direct
donation (𝑔𝑖∗ ) under the VCM, individual i can determine an optimal fraction 𝛼𝑖+ that makes her
contributions under the GTM equal to the same under the VCM (Kotchen and Moore, 2007). We
test this theoretical proposition of equivalent mechanisms in the laboratory experiment.
At this juncture, an important result concerning individual preferences, others’
contributions, and crowding out can be summarized in the following proposition.
∗
Proposition 1: Under pure altruism, an increase in 𝑔−𝑖
(perfectly) crowds out 𝑔𝑖∗ in 1:1 terms.

Proof: See appendix.

8

There is a threshold level for the green tariff (𝜋𝐿 ), below which an individual maximizes her utility by paying the
green tariff on her entire consumption of the private good (corner solution). Put differently, when 𝜋 < 𝜋𝐿 , the
constraint 𝛼𝑖 ∈ [0, 1] binds at 𝛼𝑖+ = 1. As long as 𝜋 < 𝜋𝐿 , total contributions (𝑔+ = 𝑛𝑀⁄(𝑃𝑌 ⁄𝜋 + 1)) continually
rise with 𝜋, however, they also stay lower than the same under the VCM or the GTM with an interior solution. If 𝑔∗
represents the total contributions to green electricity at the symmetric Nash equilibrium under the VCM or the GTM
< 𝑔∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝜋 < 𝜋𝐿
with an interior solution, then the solution to 𝜋𝐿 is given by 𝑔∗ ⁄𝑔+ = 1, which implies 𝑔+ {
.
= 𝑔∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝜋 ≥ 𝜋𝐿

7

The crowding out behavior arises due to the fact that an individual characterized by pure
altruism (whereby he cares only about the total contributions) considers others’ contributions as
a perfect substitute for his own contributions. Given their equivalence, perfect crowd-out holds
for both the VCM and GTM (Bergstrom et al., 1986).9 We experimentally test this proposition.
2.3 The All-or-Nothing Green Tariff Mechanism (A/NGTM)
The A/NGTM requires a participating consumer to pay the green tariff on the entire
electricity consumption. We investigate the A/NGTM in more detail as its theoretical properties
are unstudied, yet utilities continue to use the mechanism to structure program enrollment. Under
the A/NGTM, each consumer faces a binary choice set: not join (𝛼̂𝑖 + = 0), or join (𝛼̂𝑖 + = 1).
Private consumption, individual and total provision under the two SNE are respectively given by
𝑦̂𝑖 + = {

𝑀⁄(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) 𝑖𝑓 𝛼̂𝑖 + = 1
𝑀⁄𝑃𝑌
𝑖𝑓 𝛼̂𝑖 + = 0

(7)

𝜋𝑀⁄(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) 𝑖𝑓 𝛼̂𝑖 + = 1
𝑔̂𝑖 = {
0
𝑖𝑓 𝛼̂𝑖 + = 0
+

𝑔̂+ = {

(8)

𝑛𝜋𝑀⁄(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) 𝑖𝑓 𝛼̂𝑖 + = 1 ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛
0
𝑖𝑓 𝛼̂𝑖 + = 0 ∀ 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛

(9)

We develop additional insight into individual decision-making under the A/NGTM in the next
two subsections.
2.3.1 Pure Altruism and the All-or-Nothing Green Tariff Mechanism
Under pure altruism, the A/NGTM will likely generate no contribution in an SNE,
provided, (i) 𝑛 is beyond a critical level and (ii) 𝜋 is held constant. The payoff matrix below
illustrates the argument. Recall that Section 2 began with the assumption that in an 𝑠-person
economy, 𝑛 (≤ 𝑠) individuals participate in a green electricity program. The matrix below is

9

For an excellent discussion, see Andreoni (1989).
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constructed by assigning three different values to 𝑛, which are 𝑛 = 𝑠, 𝑛 = (𝑠 − 1), and 𝑛 = 0.
The two rows in the matrix represent individual i's strategies (𝛼̂𝑖 + = 1 and 𝛼̂𝑖 + = 0). Each
strategy is evaluated at two extreme situations (which form the columns): (a) when everyone else
in the economy participates and (b) when no one else participates. The first (second) argument in
the indirect utility function in each cell represents individual 𝑖’s private (green electricity)
consumption.

𝛼̂𝑖+ = 1
𝛼̂𝑖+ = 0

𝛼̂𝑗+ = 1 ∀ 𝑗, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖

𝛼̂𝑗+ = 0 ∀ 𝑗, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖

𝑀
𝑠𝜋𝑀
𝑉(
,
)
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝑀 (𝑠 − 1)𝜋𝑀
𝑉( ,
)
𝑃𝑌 (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)

𝑀
𝜋𝑀
𝑉(
,
)
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝑀
𝑉 ( , 0)
𝑃𝑌

Note that the strategy profile (𝛼̂𝑖+ = 1, 𝛼̂𝑗+ = 0 ∀ 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑠, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) indicates that only
individual i participates in the program. A more general version of this situation can be denoted
by a strategy profile (𝛼̂𝑖+ = 1 ∀ 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝛼̂𝑗+ = 0 ∀ 𝑗 = (𝑛 + 1), … , 𝑠), where (without loss of
generality) the first 𝑛 individuals participate and the remaining (𝑠 − 𝑛) individuals do not.
Clearly, the (𝑠 − 𝑛) nonparticipants do not make any difference to the program. As such, a
comparative statics analysis of an SNE should focus exclusively on the participants. If there are
𝑛 participants, the A/NGTM can generate positive total contributions under a symmetric
equilibrium, if, conceptually, the following two inequalities are satisfied.
𝑉(𝛼̂1+ = 1, . . . , 𝛼̂𝑖+ = 1, . . . , 𝛼̂𝑛+ = 1) ≥ 𝑉(𝛼̂1+ = 0, . . . , 𝛼̂𝑖+ = 0, . . . , 𝛼̂𝑛+ = 0)

(10)

𝑉(𝛼̂1+ = 1, . . . , 𝛼̂𝑖+ = 0, . . . , 𝛼̂𝑛+ = 1) ≤ 𝑉(𝛼̂1+ = 1, . . . , 𝛼̂𝑖+ = 1, . . . , 𝛼̂𝑛+ = 1)

(11)

Equation (10) states that individual i must derive equal or more utility in an SNE in
which everyone participates, compared to another SNE with no participant. Equation (11), which
can be called the free ride disincentive constraint (FRDC), states that individual i must not be
better off by free riding on others’ contributions. Note that if the FRDC holds true, equation (10)

9

becomes trivial. As such, under pure altruism, the FRDC holds the key to revenue generation.
Using the above matrix and dropping the ‘i’ subscript, we can rewrite equation (11) as
𝑉(

𝑀 (𝑛 − 1)𝜋𝑀
𝑀
𝑛𝜋𝑀
,
) ≤ 𝑉(
,
)
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝑃𝑌 (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)

(12)

Economic intuition suggests that under pure altruism, the restrictive binary choice set
under A/NGTM results in a strong individual incentive to free ride. Unlike the VCM/GTM, an
individual cannot adjust her contributions along a continuous curve in response to an increase in
𝑛 under the A/NGTM. To overcome this problem, the electricity supplier must continuously
reduce 𝜋 to preserve the individual rationale for contributions. However, since electricity prices
are often sticky (i.e., they are commonly set in state regulatory proceedings and are cost-based),
this comparative static result shows the difficulty in administering the A/NGTM under pure
altruism. Moreover, if 𝑈 is concave in 𝑔, 𝑛 does not need to be too large for the FRDC to fail if
𝜋 is fixed (refer to Example 2 below). In sum, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Under the A/NGTM, if 𝜋 is held constant and 𝑛 is above a critical level (𝑛 >
𝑛𝐶 (𝜋)), 𝑔̂+ will drop to zero if individual preferences are characterized by pure altruism.
Proof: See the appendix.
Under pure altruism there exists a subtle distinction between the effect of an increase in 𝑛
on (a) individual contributions under the VCM (𝑔𝑖∗ ) or the flexible GTM (𝑔𝑖+ ), and (b) individual
contributions under the A/NGTM (𝑔̂𝑖+ ). We observe that when 𝑛 → ∞, 𝑔𝑖∗ → 0 and 𝑔̂𝑖+ → 0
(assuming 𝜋 is held constant). However, total contributions will be different between (a) and (b).
lim 𝑛𝑔𝑖∗ > lim 𝑛𝑔̂𝑖+ |

𝑛→∞
𝑔𝑖∗ →0

𝑛→∞

𝜋=𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡

= lim 𝑛 ∗ 0 = 0
𝑛→∞

10

The extreme left hand side of the above inequality shows the limiting level of total contributions
under the VCM (or the flexible GTM), and the limit is positive. The adjacent expression stands
for the limiting level of total contributions under the A/NGTM, when 𝜋 is held constant. An
increase in 𝑛 in a regime of fixed 𝜋 eventually leads individual (and total) contributions to drop
to zero. This result demonstrates a counterintuitive situation in which fewer participants are
preferred for revenue generation. As such, the classical result – that total contributions increase
with 𝑛 in an interior solution of the VCM and GTM –, will not hold under the A/NGTM.
2.3.2 Warm-Glow Preferences and the All-or-Nothing Green Tariff Mechanism
This subsection provides a plausible explanation for contributions under the A/NGTM.
Consider a representative individual with a warm-glow utility function given by
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 , 𝑔, 𝐶𝑖 ), where

𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑔

> 0 and

𝜕2 𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑔2

<0

The additional argument (𝑔𝑖 ) implies that individual i derives utility from her own contributions.
Given this, the equilibrium conditions in equation (12) can be modified as
𝑉(

𝑀 (𝑛 − 1)𝜋𝑀
𝑀
𝜋𝑀
𝑛𝜋𝑀
, 0,
) ≤ 𝑉(
,
,
)
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝑃𝑌

(12′)

The equation carries similar implications as before; however, an additional warm-glow
component is introduced. The effect of an increase in n on individual contributions now hinges
on two opposing individual incentives: the free riding incentive explained before, and the warmglow motive that induces contributions. As a consequence of these opposing incentives, 𝜋 does
not necessarily need to be adjusted downward to preserve the individual rationale for
contributions, which can potentially satisfy the FRDC for positive provision. Economic intuition
suggests that under warm-glow preferences, others’ contributions serves as an imperfect
substitute for own contributions, and as such, free riding may lead to a loss in individual utility.
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2.4 Examples
Three examples provide insight into the workings of the mechanisms.
Example 1: Suppose the price of the private good is 𝑃𝑌 and individual income is M. Assume that
𝐶𝑖 = 𝐶 ∀ 𝑖 and individual preferences (pure altruism) are 𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑔) = √𝑦𝑖 + 𝐶 √𝑔𝑖 + 𝑔−𝑖 .
For these specifications, the SNE under the VCM is given by10
{𝑦𝑖∗ =

𝑛𝑀
,
(𝑛 + 𝐶 2 𝑃𝑌 )𝑃𝑌

𝑔𝑖∗ =

𝐶 2 𝑃𝑌 𝑀
∀𝑖
(𝑛 + 𝐶 2 𝑃𝑌 )

Under the GTM, the SNE is given by
{𝑦𝑖+

𝑀
=
,
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)

{𝑦𝑖+ =

𝑔𝑖+

𝜋𝑀
𝐶 2 𝑃𝑌2
=
∀ 𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝜋 < 𝜋𝐿 =
and
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝑛

𝑛𝑀
𝐶 2 𝑃𝑌 𝑀
𝐶 2 𝑃𝑌2
+
,
𝑔
=
∀
𝑖
𝑖𝑓
𝜋
≥
𝜋
=
𝐿
𝑖
(𝑛 + 𝐶 2 𝑃𝑌 )𝑃𝑌
(𝑛 + 𝐶 2 𝑃𝑌 )
𝑛

The VCM and GTM are asymptotically equivalent (since as 𝑛 → ∞, 𝜋𝐿 → 0). Put differently,
individual incentive to free ride increases with 𝑛 and therefore the constraint 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1 does not
bind, resulting in 𝜋𝐿 → 0. If we let 𝐶 = 1, 𝑀 = 120, 𝑃𝑌 = 1, 𝑛 = 4, and 𝜋 ≥ 0.25, then 𝑔𝑖∗ =
𝑔𝑖+ = 24. At the SNE, each individual spends 20% of her budget on green electricity.
Example 2: Consider the A/NGTM when individual preferences are the same as in the previous
example. In two steps, the FRDC (equation (12)) simplifies to
√𝑀
√(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)

+𝐶

√𝑛𝜋𝑀
√(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)

≥

√𝑀
√𝑃𝑌

+𝐶

√(𝑛 − 1)𝜋𝑀
√(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)

⇒

1
√𝜋

≥

2
1
[𝑃 − 𝐶 2 {√𝑛 − √(𝑛 − 1)} ]
𝑌

2𝐶 [√𝑛 − √(𝑛 − 1)]

= 𝜑(𝑛)

Therefore, a representative individual’s contributions at the SNE is given by

10

Note that the marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the public good at the SNE under the VCM (or GTM with
interior solutions) is given by: 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑅 = C√ng i∗ = √120n⁄(n + 1), (assuming C = PY = 1 and M = 120). Now if
n = 4,5,6 or 7, then MPCR = 9.80, 10, 10.14 or 10.25. This formulation is in complete accord with treatment #3
(that states altering n also alters MPCR) on page 182 in Isaac & Walker (1988). We thank an anonymous referee for
bringing our attention to this insightful paper.
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𝜋𝑀
1
𝑖𝑓
≥ 𝜑(𝑛)
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝜋
+
√
𝑔̂𝑖 =
{

0; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Since 𝜑(𝑛) is an increasing function of n, if n increases, 𝜋 must decrease. If 𝐶 = 1, 𝑃𝑌 = 1, 𝑛 =
4 as before, the highest 𝜋 that can sustain positive provision at the SNE is given by 𝜋𝐻 = 0.33.
The line segments ADGH, ACFH, and ABEH in Figure 1 represent an individual’s
(leftward shifting) optimal decision function for 𝑛 = 4, 8, and 16, respectively. When 𝑛 = 4 (or
𝑛 = 16), an individual chooses 𝛼 = 100% as long as 𝜋 ∈ (0, 0.33] (or 𝜋 ∈ (0, 0.07]).
Example 3: Consider the A/NGTM when individual preferences (warm-glow) are 𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑔) =
√𝑦𝑖 + 𝑎(𝑔𝑖 ) + 𝐶 √𝑔𝑖 + 𝑔−𝑖 . Consider two different situations, (i) when 𝑎(𝑔𝑖 ) is concave, given
by 𝑎(𝑔𝑖 ) = 0.5√𝑔𝑖 and (ii) when 𝑎(𝑔𝑖 ) is linear, given by 𝑎(𝑔𝑖 ) = 0.2𝑔𝑖 .
(i) If 𝑎(𝑔𝑖 ) = 0.5√𝑔𝑖 , individual i’s contributions at an SNE are given by

𝑔̂𝑖+

𝜋𝑀
1
𝑖𝑓
≥
= (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
√𝜋
{

[

2
1
− {𝐶(√𝑛 − √(𝑛 − 1)) + 0.5} ]
𝑃𝑌

2[𝐶(√𝑛 − √(𝑛 − 1)) + 0.5]

0; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

The condition attached with the positive provision is derived by using the FRDC. The
constraint still reflects that 𝜋 should be adjusted downward when 𝑛 is growing. However, for the
same parameter specifications as in Example 2, the highest 𝜋 that can sustain positive provision
at an SNE is 14.02; this is much more than 0.33 (as in pure altruism). Thus, strictly speaking, the
warm-glow utility function almost eliminates the revenue generation problem.
(ii) If 𝑎(𝑔𝑖 ) = 0.2𝑔𝑖 , individual i’s contributions at an SNE are given by

𝑔̂𝑖+

𝜋𝑀
1
𝜋
𝑖𝑓 𝐶(√𝑛 − √(𝑛 − 1)) ≥ −
[0.2𝜋√𝑀 + {√(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) − √(1 + ) (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)}]
= (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝑃𝑌
√𝜋(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
{

0; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
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Since the left hand side of the (simplified) FRDC above is positive and the right hand
side of the same constraint would be negative (provided 𝑀 and/or 𝑃𝑌 is not too small), we
conclude that the revenue generation problem may not occur when the warm-glow component in
the utility function is linear. If 𝑀 = 120, 𝑃𝑌 = 1 as before, the above constraint reduces to
𝐶(√𝑛 − √(𝑛 − 1)) ≥ −

1
√𝜋(1 + 𝜋)

[1.19𝜋 + √(1 + 𝜋) − 1] = 𝑎 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟

Finally, if a representative individual is egoistic with a utility function 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 ),
(where

𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑔𝑖

> 0 and

𝜕2 𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑔𝑖2

< 0), which indicates he treats own contributions as a private good, the

revenue generation problem is completely eliminated.
In sum, economic theory can explain provision of green electricity under the A/NGTM in
a large economy only when at least some participants have warm-glow or egoistic preferences.
The VCM or GTM, in contrast, can explain provision without such a requirement on preferences.
Proposition 3: In comparison to the situation where individual preferences are characterized by
pure altruism, the revenue generation problem at a symmetric equilibrium under the A/NGTM is
(a) almost eliminated if individual preferences consist of a concave warm-glow component, (b)
eliminated if individual preferences consist of either a linear warm-glow component (assuming
M and/or PY to be not too small) or an egoistic component.
The critical question is: given the nature of preferences of the potential participants,
which green electricity provision mechanism should a utility company offer? An insight into the
potential participants’ preferences can be developed by public opinion polls, surveys, or
questionnaires (Oberholzer-Gee, 2001). As such, it is natural to compare the level of individual
contributions (at an SNE) under all the mechanisms, in the presence of pure altruism or warmglow.
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Figure 2 demonstrates, for all three mechanisms, how individual contributions relate to
the number of participants under pure altruism (‘PA’) and warm-glow (‘WG’).11 In comparison
to the base case of PA under the VCM/GTM, the individual contributions function shifts upward
when a WG component is included in the utility function. Inclusion of a WG component in the
utility function drastically increases individual contributions (which asymptote to a constant)
under the A/NGTM, in comparison to the VCM/GTM. As such, the A/NGTM may generate
more revenue in service areas with participants who derive a distinct pleasure from their own
contributions, compared to the VCM/GTM. It follows that an electric utility company can exploit
this feature by offering the A/NGTM to WG-type participants. Therefore, prior to deciding
which mechanism to offer, a utility company may consider surveying its customers in an attempt
to understand the nature of their preferences.

3. Setup of Experimental Games
The theoretical results frame two lines of inquiry for the laboratory experiments. First,
the equivalence between the VCM and GTM raises the issue of whether, in reality, these two
mechanisms generate the same revenue for an environmental public good.12 Put in a more
general context, how would the incidence of revenue generation compare between a pure public
good mechanism and an equivalent impure public good mechanism? We develop the VCM game
and the GTM game to test the prediction of equal revenue generation. Second, the theory for the
11

The parameters used for Figure 2 are: 𝐶 = 𝑃𝑌 = 𝜋 = 1 and 𝑀 = 120. As in Example 3(i), the warm-glow
component in the utility function is assumed to be 0.5√𝑔𝑖 . With these specifications, individual contributions under
1

2

1

2

the VCM and GTM are given by: 𝑔𝑖∗ = 𝑔𝑖+ = [120 (0.5 + ) ] ⁄ [1 + (0.5 + ) ].
√𝑛
√𝑛
12
Economists have long entertained the idea of experimental scrutiny of mechanisms that predict equal revenue
generation in theory, particularly in the context of auction theory. Experimental studies, for example, on the
equivalence of the Dutch auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction (Cox, Roberson and Smith, 1982; LuckingReily, 1999), and on the English auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction (Kagel, Harstad and Levin, 1987),
developed a deeper insight into participants’ decision making. In view of this literature, and also due to the lack of
appropriate revenue data from naturally occurring markets, we investigate the predictions of the pure and the impure
public good provision mechanisms (VCM and GTM) using experimental techniques.
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A/NGTM predicts that, in a regime of a fixed green tariff, individual contributions will drop to
zero (remain positive) provided preferences are characterized by pure altruism (warm-glow). We
develop the A/NGTM game to assess the effect of individual preferences on contributions.
3.1 Description of the Three Games
Each participant13 in the VCM game is endowed with a fixed income (𝑀). Each
participant simultaneously and independently determines the amount (𝑦𝑖 ) to be spent on the
private good. The rest (𝑔𝑖 ) of the fixed income is donated as contributions to the environmental
public good. After all participants have made their individual decisions, the total provision of the
environmental public good (𝑔) is calculated. Individual utility-payoff is then determined by 𝑦𝑖
and 𝑔, according to the equation 𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑔) = √𝑦𝑖 + √𝑔𝑖 + 𝑔−𝑖 .
The GTM game differs from the VCM game in only one aspect. Under the GTM each
participant determines a percentage (𝛼𝑖 ) of private consumption for contributions. The choice of
𝛼𝑖 determines individual contributions (𝑔𝑖 ) and individual spending on the private good (𝑦𝑖 ).
In both games, each participant is endowed with an income of 𝑀 = 120 units.14 Price of
the private good is given by 𝑃𝑌 = 1. The number of participants in each group is set at 𝑛 = 4,
which determines the size of the economy. For these parameter specifications, if the green tariff
is 0.25 or above, the GTM and the VCM will lead to an identical outcome. In the GTM game, we
set the green tariff at 𝜋 = 1 to result in the prediction of identical outcomes across games.
The setup corresponds to a game with complete information, whereby each participant
has information on others’ utility-payoff and budget. The SNE is given by 𝑔𝑖∗ = 24 ∀ 𝑖 (under
the VCM) and 𝛼𝑖∗ = 25% ∀ 𝑖 (under the GTM). In either case, at the SNE: (i) each participant
In the context of the experiment, “participant” refers to a subject in the public-good games. In the theoretical
models, in contrast, “participant” refers to an individual who makes a positive contribution to the public good.
14
We deliberately choose M = 120 (and not 100). The choice of 100 is “focal” and can potentially lead a participant
to a focal 50-50 allocation of her budget between 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑔𝑖 . See Goeree and Holt (2005) for a similar approach.
13
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spends 96 units on private consumption and 24 units on contributions, (ii) total provision of the
environmental public good in a four-person economy is 96 units, and (iii) each participant’s
utility-payoff is 19.60 (≅ √96 + √4 × 24). Note that if each participant contributes her entire
income (under the VCM) to the environmental public good, then each will derive a utility-payoff
of 21.91 (≅ √480). Likewise, if each participant chooses to pay the green tariff on 100% of her
private consumption (under the GTM) to the environmental public good, she will receive a
utility-payoff of 23.24 (≅ √60 + √4 × 60).
Moving on to the A/NGTM game, our objective is to select a fixed group size and a fixed
green tariff such that the theory predicts zero (positive) contributions from individuals whose
preferences are characterized by pure altruism (warm-glow/egoism). Accordingly, we modify
two parameters of the previous games. Individual income, utility-payoff function, and price of
the private good remain unchanged. However, the green tariff is set at 𝜋 = 0.4 and the group size
is set at 𝑛 = 5. The choice of the green tariff and the group size are motivated by the theoretical
prediction that (under pure altruism) the free ride disincentive constraint is not satisfied when
𝑛 = 5. As such, the SNE for individual i is given by 𝛼̂𝑖+ = 0% (pure altruism) and by 𝛼̂𝑖+ =
100% (warm-glow/egoism). Since individual and total contributions drop to zero at the SNE
under pure altruism, each individual derives a utility-payoff of 10.95 (= √120) from private
consumption. The zero contribution SNE originates from the prediction that, if everyone else
contributes, an individual (characterized by pure altruism) gains 0.31 units from free riding.
3.2 Experimental Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. In
what follows, we first describe the sessions under the VCM and GTM. After that, we discuss the
A/NGTM sessions, highlighting the main differences.
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We conducted three sessions each for the VCM and GTM games. The number of
participants in each of the VCM sessions was 12. The number of participants in the three GTM
sessions was 8, 16 and 16. No individual participated in more than one session. On average, each
session lasted about 70 minutes. All participants were given sufficient time to understand the
experimental instructions, and all of their questions were answered before they started making
decisions.15
In each session, the same game was played for 12 decision rounds.16 At the beginning of
each round, participants were randomly matched to form groups of four participants. For each
session we employed the stranger matching protocol, under which each participant was randomly
matched with three other participants in each decision round. The four matched participants
formed a group (termed an ‘economy’ in the previous sections); however, the composition of
each group kept changing in each decision round. An average session with 12 participants had
three groups in each round. At the end of each round, each participant was apprised of her
private consumption, total provision of the environmental public good by her group, points she
earned in that decision round, and cumulative total points she had earned through that round.
Each participant was rewarded in terms of points (equal to her utility-payoff) in each
decision round. At the end of each session, all points earned by a participant were added and
converted to US Dollar at the rate of $1 per 15 points. If each decision round in a session were
played according to the SNE strategy, each participant would earn $15.68. In addition, each
participant was given a lump-sum $5 for showing up.
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The instructions given to participants are available upon request from the corresponding author.
Note that despite a finite repetition of the game, application of the backward induction principle will lead to the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in each game which is identical to the unique Nash equilibrium in the
one-shot game.
16
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The experimental sessions were computerized with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2009). Each
participant received a sheet of experimental instructions upon arrival. To promote strict
anonymity, we did not identify the participants by any registration number and let the computers
identify each participant internally. In each round of the VCM sessions, each participant chose
her private consumption by entering a number (up to two decimal digits) from the set [0, 120] on
the computer screen. For the GTM sessions, each participant recorded the percentage of her
private consumption she wanted to contribute by selecting a whole number from the set {0, 1,
…., 99, 100}.17 The same procedure was repeated for all 12 decision rounds. At the end of the
12th round of a session, each participant was privately paid the sum of money he/she had earned.
Moving on to the A/NGTM game, three sessions were conducted with five participants
per group in each round. The number of participants per session was 15. As such, three different
groups were formed in each round, in which each participant recorded from a binary choice set
{100%, 0%} the percentage of private consumption he/she allocated to environmental
contributions. Participants who chose 100% contributed 34.29 units.
The experimental design applied the stranger matching protocol (Andreoni 1995a,
1995b), which retains the one-shot nature of a game, but allows participants to develop gamespecific experience over the decision rounds. Since we were interested in the behavior of
experienced participants, we repeated each game for 12 rounds. After each round, each
participant was notified of the total contributions by her group, and no information was provided
about any other group. Moreover, to minimize the chance of a participant making her decision in
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We let the participants choose numbers with decimal digits under the VCM because a corresponding percentage
choice with a whole number under the GTM may actually result in a contribution with decimal digits.
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any round based on her (or others’) decisions in earlier rounds, we did not make the history of
decisions available to the participants.18

4. Experimental Results
Section 4 reports the results in a series of sub-sections: summary of the VCM and GTM
sessions, first-round play, average play, group-level play, summary of the A/NGTM sessions,
and questionnaire results.
4.1 Summary of Experimental Sessions
Table 1 describes how group-level (environmental public good) provision, group-level
private consumption, individual percentage choice, and individual earnings vary across the
experimental sessions. On average, a group of four participants contributed 266.53 (175.20) units
in a given decision round under the VCM (GTM) sessions. Therefore, (i) the average group-level
contributions (private consumption) are significantly higher (lower) in the VCM sessions than in
the GTM sessions, and (ii) for both VCM and GTM sessions, group-level average contributions
are significantly higher than the SNE prediction of 96 units. Table 1 also shows that,
interestingly, average individual payoff is almost invariant to the game with average individual
earnings of $23.82 in the VCM and $23.33 in the GTM. At the same time, the dispersion of
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In principle, cooperation among the participants can be one of the reasons (but certainly not the sole reason)
behind greater than Nash equilibrium contributions in a public good game, as has been indicated in many studies,
such as Andreoni (1995, 1995). Indeed, if the participants in an experimental public good game have warm-glow
preferences (which our results are indicative of), cooperation is likely to occur (Andreoni, QJE, 1995). While it is
difficult to completely remove the possibility of cooperation in a public good game that is repeated for multiple
rounds, an experimenter can potentially nullify the impact of cooperation by adopting strategies that may include (i)
a stranger matching protocol, (ii) limiting the number of rounds of play, (iii) comparing the first round data across
the treatments, which does not result from any cooperative behavior, and examining evidence of any treatment effect
during that first round, and (iv) in our context, running a questionnaire on environmental issues and examining
whether more environmentally conscious participants contribute more to the environmental public good. Finally,
after all these checks, if there still exists a doubt about the impact of cooperation, an experimenter may put forward a
counter argument. If cooperation were to impact the outcome, it would impact each experimental game on a
symmetrical basis, provided the sample size for each game is large. Therefore, any difference in the outcome across
the experimental games should be attributable to the built-in features of those games.
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individual contributions is larger with the VCM such that the heterogeneity of individual
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earnings is greater with the VCM relative to the GTM (Table 2).
The superiority of the VCM over the GTM relates directly to a broader environmental
implication. Without affecting individual welfare, the VCM would result in substantially more
revenue for the environment and hence significantly lower pollution, relative to the GTM.
4.2 First Round Play
The set of decisions made in the first round of play is often regarded as the purest basis of
comparison between two or more treatments, as it precludes any potentially confounding effect.
Any statistical difference between the set of first round decisions across games is therefore
attributable to difference(s) in the games, provided the sample size is large. In the first decision
round, the average group (individual) level provision is 289 units (72.25 units) under the VCM
sessions (with 9 independent groups and 36 independent participants). The corresponding
average group (individual) level provision is 172.11 units (43.03 units) under the GTM sessions
(with 10 independent groups and 40 independent participants). The null hypothesis of equality of
the first round average group-level provision under the VCM and GTM (the alternative being the
former was higher than the latter) is rejected at a 1% level of significance (t = 4.69 with equal
variances not assumed in the test).
4.3 Average Play in the Sessions
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the average group-level provision for each session
under the VCM and GTM. Focusing on the first two sessions under the VCM, the level of
provision does not diverge much from a level of roughly 260 units for VCM S1 and 230 units
for VCM S2. The average provision for the third session under the VCM stays close to 300 units
from round six onwards, with the only exception of a sudden decline in decision round 12. This
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decline can perhaps be explained by participants’ increased propensity to free ride in the last
decision round. The lower panel shows comparable data for the GTM sessions. Average grouplevel provision for the three GTM sessions stabilizes roughly at a level close to 180 units.
4.4 Group-level Play in the Sessions
For completeness, it is customary to document that the significant difference in average
provision between the VCM and GTM sessions in Figure 3 is a general pattern for most of the
groups, and it is not caused by some outlier groups. Figure 4 shows group-level total provision
for each decision round. Considering all the VCM (GTM) sessions combined, there are nine
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(ten) group-level observations for each round. The scatter-triangles (scatter-squares) represent
group-level provision under the VCM (GTM). In general, the VCM exceeds the GTM: for each
round, a majority of the scatter-triangles are above the corresponding scatter-squares.
Overall, the results suggest that the VCM is a superior mechanism from the viewpoint of
revenue generation for the environmental public good.
4.5 Summary of A/NGTM Sessions
Table 3 reports the summary statistics from the A/NGTM sessions. 29% of the
participants’ decisions were choices not to contribute. Recall that for a five-member group, the
private incentive to free ride arises in equilibrium, which is supported by the empirical result that
the fraction of contributing individuals lies between 0.63 and 0.78 over the decision rounds.
4.6 Questionnaire Results
To gain further insight into the participants’ motives for contribution, we developed a
computer-based questionnaire for each participant to complete at the end of each session. The
questionnaire (patterned after Kotchen and Moore (2007)) did not affect participants’ previously
determined earnings, and was primarily aimed at understanding participants’ attitudes toward
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environmental as well as social/altruistic issues. Environmental aspects were captured by
implementing the statements from the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) (Dunlap et al., 2000),
and social aspects were captured by using statements developed by Kotchen and Moore (2007),
which follow the Schwartz model for altruistic behavior (Schwartz, 1970, 1977).
Five (six) statements were used for the NEP (Altruism) scale.19 Each participant indicated
his/her opinion with respect to each of the statements on a 5-point Likert scale, varying from
strongly disagree to strongly agree. In each case, a higher value indicates more environmental
(altruistic) concern. Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the summated NEP scale and the
summated Altruism scale. Overall, we do not observe any statistically significant difference
between participants’ average NEP (or Altruism) scores under the VCM and GTM sessions.

5. Regression Results
5.1 Explaining Contributions in the VCM and GTM Sessions
We estimate ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regressions to explain individual contributions
(𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑘 ) using the specification:
𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑉𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽2 𝑔−𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝐸𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘
where i indexes individuals, j indexes decision rounds, and k indexes sessions; VCM is the
treatment effect variable for a VCM game (0 if GTM; 1 if VCM); 𝑔−𝑖 is contributions by other
group members; NEP is the NEP summated scale; ALT is the Altruism summated scale;
GENDER is a dummy variable (0 if male; 1 if female); 𝛾𝑗 are decision round fixed effects; 𝛿𝑘 are
session fixed effects; and 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘 is an idiosyncratic error term. We apply individual-level clusterrobust standard errors. Table 4 presents the corresponding regression estimates.
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The Altruism scale should not be confused with the concept of pure altruism discussed earlier. The Altruism scale
reflects generosity of an individual in reference to social issues.
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In a specification without other explanatory variables, the treatment effect on individual
contributions in a VCM round relative to a GTM round was, on average, a statistically
significant increase of 30.50 units. This decreases to 20.58 units, still statistically significant, in a
specification with other variables. The smaller number is close to what the summary statistics in
Table 2 suggests, and it represents the preferred estimate of the treatment effect.
The coefficient on the NEP scale is statistically significant and positive – something one
would ideally expect to observe. A one unit increase in NEP scale leads to 2.61 additional units
of individual contributions. A one standard deviation increase of the NEP scale from its mean
will result in approximately 5.19 units of additional contribution to the environmental public
good. In contrast, individuals motivated by altruistic (social) concerns do not contribute more
than others. GENDER is also not a significant determinant of individual contributions. We
include total contributions by others as a regressor to assess whether an increase in others’
contributions crowds out individual contributions, something Proposition 1 (above) predicts in
1:1 terms, i.e., the theory predicts a coefficient of –1. We find that an increase in others’
contributions partially crowds out individual contributions. A one unit increase in others’
contributions leads to a 0.1 unit decrease in individual contributions. This is consistent with a
warm-glow motive for contributing.
The specification with other explanatory variables includes an interaction term between
GENDER and the treatment effect to assess whether women and men behave with a distinct
difference in the VCM game relative to the GTM game. We found no effect here. Note, in
addition, that the sign, size, and significance of the coefficients on the other explanatory
variables were virtually unchanged in a pooled OLS regression without the interaction term.
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We also estimate two separate tobit regressions, one for the VCM sessions and the other
for the GTM sessions. (The regression equation above can be modified to develop a corner
solution model as a basis for a tobit regression (Wooldridge, Chapter 17, 2010).) The tobit
regressions originate from the fact that individual contributions to the environmental public good
are bounded within [0, 120] for the VCM sessions and within [0, 60] for the GTM sessions. In
each case, a tobit model is estimated using the respective bounds. Estimated coefficients and
marginal effects are reported in Table 4, with the marginal effects naturally smaller in absolute
value yet showing the same pattern of statistical significance as the coefficients. In general, each
included regressor in these two models impacts individual contributions in a manner consistent
with the OLS regression.20 In particular, the crowd-out effect continues as a statistically
significant, yet small, negative number. The estimated coefficient on the NEP scale changes to
insignificant in the GTM regression.
Overall, we observe that (i) environmental concerns motivate individual contributions in
the VCM sessions, and (ii) the VCM sessions generate more contributions than the GTM
sessions, despite the absence of any significant difference between the participants’
environmental concerns in one game versus another (Table 2) and also after controlling for such
concerns in the regressions.
5.2 Explaining Contributions in the A/NGTM Sessions
In Section 2, we reached the theoretical conclusion that individual preferences can play a
more tangible role in shaping the binary participation decision under the A/NGTM, relative to

20

As suggested by use of the tobit estimator, the OLS estimator might be inconsistent due to the bounds on
contributions. Note, however, that the estimated marginal effects on the individual variables are quite similar in
magnitude and significance across the three regressions. This suggests that any inconsistency is not severe.
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the VCM or GTM.21 To probe this empirically, the participants were asked in the questionnaire
about their attitude toward contributions to an environmental project. The four possible answers
were: (i) unconcerned, (ii) care about only the total group-level contributions (pure altruism),
(iii) care about the total group-level contributions, as well as my own contributions (warm-glow)
and (iv) care about my own contributions only (egoism). We converted these choices into a
binary variable by assigning a value of 1 when a participant indicated that he/she cared about
own contributions (choices (iii) and (iv)) and 0 otherwise (choices (i) and (ii)). Table 3 indicates
that preferences were evenly distributed between the two categories.
Table 5 reports the estimates of a logit regression model in which the dependent
variable (𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘 ) is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual contributes (“all”) and 0
otherwise (“nothing”). The estimator is:
Prob(𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1) = Λ(β'x),
where Λ (•) is the logistic distribution and
𝛃′ 𝐱 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝐸𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑘
where i indexes individuals, j indexes decision rounds, and k indexes sessions; PREFERNC is a
binary variable for the individual’s expressed attitude toward environmental contributions (1 if
warm-glow/egoism; 0 otherwise); 𝛾𝑗 are decision round fixed effects; and 𝛿𝑘 are session fixed
effects. The other explanatory variables have the same meaning as before.
We report the marginal effects. The marginal effects for the NEP scale, Altruism scale,
and the Gender variable are statistically significant. An interesting feature of the regression is the
role of the PREFERNC variable, which distinguishes individuals by whether they derive utility
21

When the number of individuals increases under the A/NGTM, individuals characterized by pure altruism are
expected to contribute zero, whereas individuals with warm-glow or egoistic preferences are expected to contribute
a positive amount. In contrast, under the VCM/GTM, individuals characterized by pure altruism are expected to
lower their contributions along a continuous curve due to a similar increase in the number of individuals (𝑔𝑖∗ or 𝑔𝑖+ is
a continuous function of 𝑛). Therefore, the nature of preferences plays a more tangible role under the A/NGTM.
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from their own contribution via warm glow or egoism, or instead, do not derive such utility. The
theory predicts that individuals were likely to contribute 34.29 or zero in these sessions,
depending upon their preferences. The marginal effect of PREFERNC is positive and statistically
significant, implying that a participant whose self-reported preferences are characterized by
either warm-glow or egoism is 28% more likely to contribute, in comparison to others. The
experimental result that, in the A/NGTM, a warm-glow or an egoist individual is substantially
more likely to contribute than others lends support to the theory.

6. Robustness of the Experimental Results on the VCM and GTM
This section addresses three issues related to features of the experimental design for the
VCM and GTM games.22
The first issue is the use of “context” (or “framing”) in the experimental instructions. To
analyze the effect of participants' environmental concern on their contributions, we motivated the
instructions using the context of renewable energy, and then used the NEP scale measure as a
regressor. However, one could argue that such context may distort preferences, such that the
significant difference in contributions across the two mechanisms may not emerge if context
were eliminated. We conducted two additional sessions each for the VCM and GTM games to
address this. Each session had 16 participants. Instructions for these sessions were identical to
the original instructions, except being devoid of environmental context. Following Andreoni
(1995), the new instructions described public-good contributions as “Investment in the Group”.
Figure 5 represents the group-level average provision for each new session. Overall, the VCM

22

Each of the experimental sessions discussed in Section 6 was comprised of four practice rounds, followed by 12
decision rounds. Since participant confusion is a common phenomenon in experimental public-goods games (see
Ferraro and Vossler, 2010), the practice rounds were meant to promote clarity in participants’ understanding of the
process of game playing and payoff calculation in each round.
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still dominates the GTM in group-level contributions to the public good; the session-level
averages for the VCM (GTM) are 242 and 227 (152 and 155). The difference in average grouplevel contributions across the mechanisms is 81 (234.5 minus 153.5). This is very similar to the
difference in average group-level contributions in the original experiments, which equaled 91
(266.53 minus 175.20, from Table 1). Thus, the context of the original experiment does not
dictate the results.
The second issue originates from the fact that participants in the GTM game chose a
“percentage” of private consumption, whereas participants in the VCM game chose the level of
private consumption. One could argue that this dissimilarity in experimental design might help to
explain the observed differences in contributions under the two mechanisms. To address this, we
conducted two additional sessions for the GTM game, each with 16 participants. Recall that if
𝜋 = 1, individual contributions (private consumption) will lie in the range [0, 60] ([60, 120]).
As such, instructions for these new GTM sessions indicated that each participant would choose
private consumption from the range [60, 120], and the remaining income would be spent on
renewable energy. Put differently, these instructions were identical to the VCM sessions
described in subsection 3.1, except that private consumption now was chosen from the range
[60, 120]. Figure 6 represents the group-level average provision for each new session. For the
first (second) session, the overall group-level average is 167.30 (172.45) and the corresponding
average individual provision is 41.83 (43.11). None of these averages is significantly different
from the corresponding average from the earlier (percentage choice) GTM sessions reported in
Tables 1 and 2.
The third issue relates to the magnitude of the green tariff. According to the theory, the
VCM and GTM will result in identical provision at the SNE as long as 𝜋 ≥ 0.25. One could
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argue that the demonstrated difference in participants’ contributions under the two mechanisms
(Tables 1 and 2) might be sensitive to our choice of 𝜋 = 1 and that the difference has not been
shown to be robust to alternative choices of 𝜋. To address this, we conducted two additional
GTM sessions, each with 16 participants: one session with 𝜋 = 1.5, and the other with 𝜋 = 0.5.
Instructions in these sessions were identical to the GTM sessions described in subsection 3.1,
except the new instructions specified 𝜋 = 1.5 or 𝜋 = 0.5. When 𝛼𝑖 = 100%, individual (group)
contributions attain a maximum of 72 (288) units under 𝜋 = 1.5, and 40 (160) units under 𝜋 =
0.5. Figure 7 represents the group-level average provision for the new sessions. For the session
with 𝜋 = 1.5, the overall group-level average is 179.57, which is not significantly different from
the corresponding average (reported in Table 1) from sessions with 𝜋 = 1. For the session with
𝜋 = 0.5, the overall group-level average is 121.80, which is significantly lower than the
corresponding average (reported in Table 1) from sessions with 𝜋 = 1. This result is due to the
fact that a 33% difference exists between the maximum possible individual contributions (= 60)
when 𝜋 = 1 and the same (= 40) when 𝜋 = 0.5. Overall, the previously observed superiority of
the VCM (over the GTM) in revenue generation is preserved when 𝜋 = 1.5, and is magnified
when 𝜋 = 0.5.

7. Conclusion
This paper studies public-goods contribution mechanisms that are commonly employed
by electric utilities in green electricity programs. We extend the theoretical results in Kotchen
and Moore (2007) and test the results using laboratory experiments. Consistent with publicgoods theory, our model predicts individual contributions to decrease and total contributions to
increase as the number of participants rises; these results hold in a SNE for the VCM and the
GTM with an interior solution. In contrast, the A/NGTM differs in an important way: as the
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number of participants rises under a constant green tariff, both individual and total contributions
go to zero. This raises a question: what explains participation in actual A/NGTM programs? We
show that warm-glow altruism can solve the problem of zero contribution. This is reminiscent of
Andreoni’s (1989) theory of warm-glow giving as a way to explain the presence of a large sector
of the economy that relies on charitable contributions for financing. The A/NGTM, in theory,
can be more effective at raising revenues than the VCM or GTM. We showed that the range of
green tariffs over which this is true is smaller than characterized in earlier research (Kotchen and
Moore, 2007).
We develop the first experimental evidence on the relative performance of two equivalent
public-goods contribution mechanisms, a pure public-goods mechanism (the VCM) and an
impure public-goods mechanism (the GTM). The VCM resulted in a 50 percent higher level of
total contributions than the GTM, this despite the theoretical prediction of equal contributions.
By its nature, the A/NGTM generates a theoretical prediction of either 0 or 100 percent
contribution in a symmetric game. In the experiment, participants enrolled even though the
prediction under pure altruism was for 0 percent. The regression results suggest that a preference
for warm-glow altruism influenced the observed enrollment by a substantial 28%, and this is
consistent with our theoretical results when a warm-glow argument enters the utility function.
Following the tradition in experimental studies of offering a plausible explanation for
deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions, we conjecture that a smaller upper bound for
individual contributions for the GTM (60, as opposed to 120 for the VCM) might explain why
the VCM generated larger contributions in the laboratory. Put differently, if pro-environmental
motives are such that they lead individuals to contribute more than what the Nash equilibrium
predicts, then such motives are faced with a more restrictive upper bound for contributions under
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the GTM; the VCM thus seems capable of generating more contributions than the GTM. We
also conjecture that, as an impure public good, the GTM requires more complicated decisionmaking, and that this might help to explain its lower contributions relative to the VCM.
Two policy or program implications emerge from our overall analysis. First, the VCM is
a preferable design for green electricity programs relative to the GTM. As future research,
comparing the VCM and GTM for a variety of green products would generate important
evidence on the environmental quality implications of these mechanisms in other contexts.
Second, the A/NGTM results point to the value of collecting data on the environmental
preferences of consumers, including the presence of a warm-glow motive. Related research
demonstrates that social prestige – which can enter the utility function as a warm-glow motive –
plays a role in green consumption (Kotchen and Moore 2008) and can vary geographically (Kahn
2007; Sexton and Sexton 2013). Using consumer surveys to acquire data on the geographic
variation in environmental warm-glow altruism could be a useful precursor to choosing a
mechanism for a particular program. With a high rate of warm-glow altruism in a local
population, for example, an electric utility should consider an A/NGTM with its potential to
generate higher revenue. These considerations of impure and pure public good approaches to
consumption of green products are important topics for future field experiments, with the
ultimate goal of increasing provision of environmental public goods through private markets.
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Appendix
Proof of Propositions
𝑑𝑔∗

Proposition 1: In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, 𝑑𝑔∗𝑖 = −1.
−𝑖

∗

Noting that 𝑔 =

𝑔𝑖∗

+

∗
𝑔−𝑖
,

equation (3) can be rewritten as

∗
∗
𝜕𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖∗ , 𝑔𝑖∗ + 𝑔−𝑖
, 𝐶𝑖 )
𝜕𝑈𝑖 (𝑦𝑖∗ , 𝑔𝑖∗ + 𝑔−𝑖
, 𝐶𝑖 )
= 𝑃𝑌
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑔𝑖

(A1)

∗
Differentiating both sides of (A1) w.r.t. to 𝑔−𝑖
one obtains

𝑑𝑦𝑖∗
𝑑𝑔𝑖∗
𝑑𝑦𝑖∗
𝑑𝑔𝑖∗
𝑈𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑖 ∗ + 𝑈𝑔𝑦𝑖 ( ∗ + 1) = 𝑃𝑌 [𝑈𝑔𝑖 𝑦𝑖 ∗ + 𝑈𝑔𝑔𝑖 ( ∗ + 1)],
𝑑𝑔−𝑖
𝑑𝑔−𝑖
𝑑𝑔−𝑖
𝑑𝑔−𝑖
𝜕2 𝑈

Where 𝑈𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑖 = 𝜕 2 𝑈𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑦𝑖2 , 𝑈𝑔𝑦𝑖 = 𝜕 2 𝑈𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝜕𝑦𝑖 , 𝑈𝑔𝑖 𝑦𝑖 = 𝜕 2 𝑈𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝑖 𝜕𝑦𝑖 and 𝑈𝑔𝑔𝑖 = 𝜕𝑔𝜕𝑔𝑖 .
𝑖

Noting that 𝑦𝑖∗ = (𝑀 − 𝑔𝑖∗ )⁄𝑃𝑌 and simplifying the above equation one obtains
(−

1
𝑑𝑔𝑖∗
𝑑𝑔𝑖∗
𝑈𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑖 + 𝑈𝑔𝑖 𝑦𝑖 ) ∗ + (𝑈𝑔𝑦𝑖 − 𝑃𝑌 𝑈𝑔𝑔𝑖 ) ∗ = −(𝑈𝑔𝑦𝑖 − 𝑃𝑌 𝑈𝑔𝑔𝑖 )
𝑃𝑌
𝑑𝑔−𝑖
𝑑𝑔−𝑖

(A2)

If we differentiate both sides of (A1) w.r.t. to 𝑦𝑖 and rearrange terms, we find
−

1
𝑈
+ 𝑈𝑔𝑖 𝑦𝑖 = 0
𝑃𝑌 𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑖

Using the above information in (A2) and rearranging terms one obtains
(𝑈𝑔𝑦𝑖 − 𝑃𝑌 𝑈𝑔𝑔𝑖 )
𝑑𝑔𝑖∗
= −1
∗ =−
𝑑𝑔−𝑖
(𝑈𝑔𝑦𝑖 − 𝑃𝑌 𝑈𝑔𝑔𝑖 )
Proposition 2 (also an illustration for subsection 2.3.1): Consider the FRDC as a function of 𝑛:
𝑀
𝑛𝜋𝑀
𝑀 (𝑛 − 1)𝜋𝑀
𝑓(𝑛) = 𝑉 (
,
) − 𝑉( ,
)
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝑃𝑌 (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
Since indirect utility functions are continuous in 𝑀, 𝑓(𝑛) is continuous.23 Now it must be that
𝑀
𝜋𝑀
𝑀
𝑓(1) = 𝑉 (
,
) − 𝑉 ( , 0) > 0,
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝑃𝑌
because there must be at least one participant in the A/NGTM program. Now consider the limit:

23

𝑓(𝑛) is continuous in 𝑛 because 𝑛𝜋𝑀and (𝑛 − 1)𝜋𝑀 can be conceived as 𝑀′ and 𝑀′′, which basically represent
two rescaled levels of income.
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lim 𝑓(𝑛) = lim [𝑉 (

𝑛→∞

𝑛→∞

𝑀
𝑛𝜋𝑀
𝑀 (𝑛 − 1)𝜋𝑀
𝑀
𝑀
,
)−𝑉( ,
)] = 𝑉 (
, ∞) − 𝑉 ( , ∞) < 0
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋) (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝑃𝑌 (𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
(𝑃𝑌 + 𝜋)
𝑃𝑌

Since 𝑓(𝑛) is continuous and 𝑓(1) > 0 and 𝑓(∞) < 0, by the intermediate value theorem, there
must exist a critical value of 𝑛 > 1, given by 𝑛𝐶 (𝜋), such that if 𝑛 ≥ 𝑛𝐶 (𝜋), 𝑓(𝑛) < 0.
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Figures
Figure 1: Percentage Contributions and Green Tariff at Equilibrium under A/NGTM
Figure 2: Individual Contributions, by Individual Preferences and Program Types
Figure 3: Average Group-Level Provision (VCM in upper panel, GTM in lower panel)
Figure 4: Scatter Plot of Group-Level Provision in VCM and GTM Sessions
Figure 5: Average Group-Level Provision in Neutral Framing Sessions (VCM vs. GTM)
Figure 6: Average Group-Level Provision in GTM Sessions with Direct Contributions Choice
Figure 7: Average Group-Level Provision in GTM Sessions under Two Different Green Tariffs
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Table 1: Summary of VCM and GTM Sessions
VCM Sessions

GTM Sessions

Average Group-Level Contributions

266.53

175.20

Average Group-Level Private Consumption

213.47

304.80

NA

66.50%

$23.82

$23.33

Average Individual Percentage Choice
Average Individual Earnings

Table 2: Summary Statistics of VCM and GTM Sessions: Mean and Standard Deviation
VCM
Sessions

GTM
Sessions

Combined

Individual contributions

66.63
(41.12)

43.80
(19.74)

54.62
(33.69)

Total contributions by others in own group

199.90
(66.85)

131.40
(32.18)

163.85
(61.89)

432

480

912

NEP scale

21.36
(2.07)

21.23
(1.93)

21.29
(1.99)

Altruism scale

24.69
(2.33)

24.30
(2.60)

24.49
(2.47)

Gender

0.56
(0.50)

0.70
(0.46)

0.63
(0.49)

36

40

76

Number of Players * Number of Decision Rounds

Number of Players

Notes: Standard deviations are provided in parentheses. NEP scale has 25 units possible. Altruism scale has 30 units
possible. Gender is a binary variable, 1 if female and 0 if male.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of A/NGTM Sessions: Mean and Standard Deviation
A/NGTM Sessions
24.38
Sessions
(15.56)
0.71
(0.45)
540
121.92
(33.26)
108
19.51
(3.00)
22.96
(4.40)
0.56
(0.50)
0.58
(0.50)
45

Individual contributions
Fraction of observations with positive contributions
Number of Players * Number of Decision Rounds
Average Group-Level Contributions
Number of Groups
NEP scale
Altruism scale
Gender
Preference
Number of Players

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. NEP (Altruism) scale has 25 (30) units possible. Gender is a binary
variable, 1 if female and 0 if male. Preference is a binary variable, 1 if warm-glow or egoism and 0 if pure altruism.
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Table 4: Regression Results: VCM and GTM Sessions
Dependent variable:
Individual contributions
Independent variables
Treatment effect
(binary, 1 if VCM)

Combined: Pooled OLS
Coefficient
30.50***
21.71*
(9.58)
(12.04)

VCM: Tobit Model

GTM: Tobit Model

Coefficient

Marginal Effect

Coefficient

Marginal Effect

NEP scale

2.62**
(1.09)

5.89**
(2.84)

2.03**
(0.98)

1.53
(1.79)

0.41
(0.49)

Altruism scale

–0.53
(0.99)

–1.76
(3.22)

–0.61
(1.11)

–0.43
(1.21)

–0.12
(0.33)

–0.10***
(0.03)

–0.17***
(0.06)

–0.06***
(0.02)

–0.14**
(0.06)

–0.04***
(0.01)

Gender
(binary, 1 if female)

–2.39
(4.57)

–4.00
(14.56)

–1.37
(5.04)

–4.24
(8.79)

–1.13
(2.31)

Treatment effect*Gender

–1.88
(10.99)

Total contributions by
others in own group

Intercept
Session fixed effects
Round fixed effects
R2
Log likelihood
N

45.29***
(3.99)
YES
YES
0.14

6.04
(31.89)
YES
YES
0.18

912

912

20.28
(86.33)
YES
YES

42.72
(54.88)
YES
YES

–1728.42
432

–1522.87
480

Notes: (i) “Combined” include observations from both VCM and GTM sessions. (ii) Individual-level cluster-robust standard
errors are in parentheses, (iii) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (iv) number of left
(right) corner-solution observations for VCM [GTM] treatment is 52 (87) [37 (165)], and (vi) right-corner solutions occur for
VCM (GTM) at an individual provision of 120 (60).

Table 5: Regression Results: A/NGTM Sessions
Dependent variable: Contribute (1 if yes, 0 if no)
Independent variables

A/NGTM
(Logit)

NEP scale

0.027*
(0.015)

Altruism scale

0.020**
(0.008)

Gender

–0.21***
(0.07)
0.28***
(0.08)
YES
YES
–263.36
540

Preference (binary, 1 if warm-glow or egoism)
Session fixed effects
Round fixed effects
Log likelihood
N

Notes: (i) Marginal effects are reported, not estimated coefficients, (ii) individual-level cluster-robust standard
errors are in parentheses, (iii) ***, **, * indicate significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively.
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